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NOTES
Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)'
of the Organized Crime Control Act of 19702 was enacted as part of an
effort to deal with organized crime, which Congress described as a
"highly sophisticated diversified and widespread activity that annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct
.... ." In an attempt to eradicate organized crime, Congress designed
RICO to include enhanced criminal penalties4 and civil sanctions5 for
those who acquire or operate an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. In addition, Congress directed that RICO was to be read
broadly. This is clear not only from Congress' overall approach and the
expansive language used, but also from its express statement that RICO
was to "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. ' 6
Nevertheless, a number of judges have tried to narrow RICO's scope,
particularly in the civil area.7
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. ,8 the Supreme Court noted that civil
RICO was "evolving into something quite different from the original
conception of its enactors" 9 partly because of the "failure of Congress
and the courts to develop a meaningful legal concept of a pattern [of
racketeering activity]."' 10 In a footnote, the Court pointed to the materi-
als that had been largely ignored in the development by the lower courts
of the concept of "pattern."" Since Sedima, courts have confronted the
problem of how to define "pattern" consistent with RICO's text, legisla-
tive history and purpose.
This note examines the concept of "pattern." Part I considers the
statute itself by examining the literal meaning within its language, legisla-
tive history and policy. Part II focuses on case law before and after
Sedima, and discusses the two primary theories courts have applied in de-
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)).
3 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). Among RICO's enhanced criminal penalties are a fine of up to
$25,000 or imprisonment of up to twenty years, or both, and forfeiture of any interest acquired or
maintained in the violation.
5 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). Among RICO's civil penalties are divestment, imposition of restric-
tions, orders of dissolution or reorganization, and treble damages.
6 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
7 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3290 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("We [have previously] ruled that the statute must be read broadly and construed liberally to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes, but like the legislative history to which the Court alludes, it is clear we
were referring there to RICO's criminal provisions.") (emphasis in original). See also Berg v. First
Am. Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 506 (D.D.C. 1984); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299,
1305 (D. Colo. 1984).
8 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
9 Id. at 3287.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 3285 n.14. See infra note 45.
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termining a pattern issue. Part III examines RICO's substantive viola-
tions and how pattern might be defined within the context of the
separate violations. Part IV concludes that no one definition of pattern
exists and that the concept must be interpreted to fit within the language
and purpose of the statute.
I. A General Overview of RICO and its Legislative History
To violate RICO a person must acquire or operate an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Congress defined "enter-
prise" by illustration only.12 Like "enterprise," Congress did not define
"pattern." Instead, it limited the concept by requiring that a pattern in-
clude "at least two acts ... one of which occurred within ten years...
after the commission of a prior act."13
Although the legislative history of RICO does not discuss pattern in
depth, it does establish certain standards for the concept. For instance,
12 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) provides that "enterprise" "includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact though not a legal entity." See also American Sur. Co. v. Morotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1932)
(" '[I]nclude' is frequently, if not generally used as a word of extension or enlargement rather than
as one of limitation or enumeration.").
Private businesses, labor organizations, and government agencies can be enterprises under
RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985) (defendants associated with
state judge's office), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1499 (1986); United States v. Swideiski, 593 F.2d 1246
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (legitimate restaurant serving as front for narcotics trafficking), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
933 (1979); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y) (labor union), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). Individuals "associated in fact" who are organized for
illicit purposes can be classified as RICO enterprises. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981) (drug trafficking and other illicit activities); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459
(11th Cir. 1985) (Outlaw Motorcycle Club), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986); United States v. Bas-
caro, 742 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1984) (drug trafficking); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214,
221-24 (3d Cir.) ("crime family" in Philadelphia), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir.) ("There is no distinction, for 'enterprise' purposes, between a
duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-
structure that controls a secret criminal network."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). Furthermore,
§ 1964(b) violations often involve legitimate associative groups which criminal activities infiltrate.
See, e.g., United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). In addition to this provision, "pattern" appears in the statute in
five different contexts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) ("pattern" requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity used by or
invested in enterprise violates RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (to acquire or maintain an enterprise
through a pattern is a RICO violation); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (to conduct or participate in an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity is a RICO violation); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (to conspire
to violate subsections (a)-(c) violates RICO). While conspiracy does not require commission of a
pattern of racketeering activities, it does require contemplation of pattern. Moreover, five kinds of
racketeering activity fall under RICO: (1) violence, (2) provision of illegal goods and services,
(3) corruption in the labor movement, (4) corruption among public officials, and (5) commercial and
other forms of fraud. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg,
58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 300-06 (1982). Also this complicated network includes the four kinds
of RICO enterprises ((1) commercial entities, (2) benevolent organizations, (3) governmental enti-
ties, or (4) associations in fact, both licit and illicit) which can play four separate but not necessarily
mutually exclusive roles in a RICO violation. The roles that enterprises can play are (1) perpetrator,
(2) victim, (3) instrument, or (4) prize. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 747
F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Blakey, supra, at 306-325), aff'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2391
(1985).
By varying the elements in a RICO violation, "pattern" may be used in at least 400 different
contexts: Five "patterns" x five "racketeering activities" x four "enterprises" x four "roles" = 400
contexts. Consequently, a single definition of pattern will not achieve the various objectives of the
statute.
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beyond the limitation of at least two acts within ten years, the legislative
history indicates that a "pattern of racketeering activity" should also re-
flect the twin factors of "relationship" and "continuity." 14 The Senate
report accompanying RICO explains that "the target of [RICO] is thus
not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally re-
quires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing
activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern."' 5 Furthermore, the bill's sponsor
pointed out that "the term 'pattern' itself requires the showing of a rela-
tionship,"' 6 and that "proof of two acts of racketeering activity without
more does not establish a patter. '17 Consequently, in establishing a
pattern, the language of the statute and legislative history requires noth-
ing more than a threat of continuing criminal activity and more than one
racketeering act to be effective.
II. Case Law Interpretation of Pattern Before and After Sedima
The "continuity plus relationship" formulation of the legislative his-
tory has not enjoyed a uniform approval by the courts in determining the
existence of a pattern. Courts have disagreed as to whether Congress
intended "relationship" to denote a relationship between the racketeer-
ing acts, or between the acts and nature and purpose of the enterprise.
As such, courts have disagreed as to when a threat of continuity exists.' 8
For instance, some courts have held that acts within a "single criminal
episode" cannot constitute a pattern,' 9 while others have held that such
an episode is within RICO's purpose. 20 Likewise, some courts require
that the predicate acts be part of a "common scheme,"' 2' while other
courts have found a RICO violation absent a common scheme 22
A. Pattern Before Sedima
Before Sedima, courts gave little attention to the concept of pattern.
The analysis did not extend beyond two arguments: Whether a pattern
can exist within a single criminal episode and whether pattern requires
the presence of a common criminal scheme.
1. Single Episode
It is difficult to fit a single criminal episode (time and place) within
the concept of pattern because, at first glance, it lacks "continuity." For
example, in United States v. Moeller,23 the United States District Court for
14 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
15 Id. (emphasis added).
16 116 CONG. REC. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
17 Id.
18 See infra notes 29-32 & 64-68 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 28.
21 See infra notes 23-27 & 64-68 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
23 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975), cert. denied sub. nom., Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977).
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the District of Connecticut held that burning a warehouse and kidnap-
ping three employees of the warehouse during the same day constituted
the pattern necessary for a RICO violation.2 4 The court stated that it
would have decided the case differently if not bound by precedent. 25
The court reasoned in dicta that because the arson and kidnapping oc-
curred in the course of a single criminal episode, it lacked the continuity
of events necessary for a pattern.26 Furthermore, the court stated that
pattern "implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes, episodes
that are at least somewhat separated in time and place yet still sufficiently
related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of activity." 27
Most courts before Sedima, however, did not follow Moeller's dicta,
but adopted the position that acts occurring with a single criminal epi-
sode could constitute a pattern.28 For instance, in United States v. Watch-
maker,29 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that three shootings of three police officers by members of the Outlaw
Motorcycle Club at the clubhouse, constituted a pattern.3 0 The court
stated that each of the three crimes resulted from a separate act and
24 Id. at 58.
25 Id. The court was referring to United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974) (inter-
state transportation of two illicitly attained cashier checks over the course of five days in furtherance
of a single scheme to defraud and take over casino-hotel constituted a "pattern" for a RICO viola-
tion), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
26 402 F. Supp. at 58.
27 Id. at 57. This reasoning, however, is faulty. The statute in § 1961(5) requires two acts of
racketeering activity, not a scheme. Furthermore, the legislative history does not mention a single
episode or transaction requirement; it merely notes the requirements of "continuity plus relation-
ship" which combine to create a pattern. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 14, at 158. In the context of
a single episode or transaction, the threat of continuity (which fulfills the other element of the pattern
requirement) is not necessarily negated by the existence of a single episode or transaction. Instead,
the threat of continuity could be inferred from the nature of the enterprise and the character of the
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475 (11th Cir. 1985) (the purpose
and nature of the illicit organization constituted the threat of continuity), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 880
(1986); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 1982) (the nature of the illicit
organization constituted the threat of continuity), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
Moreover, the Moeller court observed: "I would further have thought that the normal canon of
narrowly construing penal statutes points towards such an interpretation." 402 F. Supp. at 57-58.
This notion contradicts the statute itself and its liberal construction clause, which reads "the provi-
sions of this Title shall be liberally construed to effectutate its remedial purposes." 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1982).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Starness, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.) (defendants conspired to
engage in a pattern of racketeering in connection with a scheme to commit arson with intent to
defraud insurer), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981). In looking at the violations which included arson,
mail fraud and Travel Act violations the court stated that "each act is a separate instance of racke-
teering activity under RICO. When two or more of these are connected to each other in the same
logical manner so as to effect an unlawful end, a pattern of racketeering exists." Id. at 677-78. See
also United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978) (defendant, who operated a
beauty college approved for veteran's vocational training, caused false student enrollment cards and
attendance certificates to be mailed to the Veteran's Administration in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud the agency); United States v. Chovannec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (single objec-
tive to defraud a single victim constituted a RICO offense when the objective was carried out
through several incidents of wire fraud). In Weatherspoon, the court found no support for the argu-
ment that RICO "require[s] a showing of separate and unrelated schemes as a precondition for
finding two indictable 'acts'... that would constitute a 'pattern.' " 581 F.2d at 678. The court also
stated that only one objective underlying the separate acts does not diminish the applicability of
RICO to those acts. Id. In essense, the court stated that merely because the acts occur within a
single episode does not necessarily defeat RICO's applicability.
29 761 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986).
30 Id. at 1475.
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therefore could constitute a pattern.3' Furthermore, the court found
that the threat of continuity required for a pattern was satisfied by the
nature and purpose of the enterprise, which existed only to engage in
diversified illegal activities.3 2
Courts should not, however, consider a single criminal episode a
pattern if it does not encompass more than one criminal act. An example
of a single episode which is not a pattern would be a single attempt to
procure marijuana in the course of a drug deal. Although a RICO viola-
tion has been persuasively argued and found under such a circum-
stance,33 the finding was incorrect. While possessing and importing
marijuana are two separate crimes under federal statutes, it mistakenly
has been considered as two acts for purposes of RICO.3 4 Only one act,
however, actually took place-receiving imported marijuana. Although
two crimes may be defined statutorily within the one act, only one act
actually takes place, and one act is not a "pattern of racketeering activity"
for purposes of RICO. RICO is aimed at a pattern of criminal acts.35
2. Common Scheme
When the criminal acts are part of a single common scheme, courts
have been receptive to finding a pattern. For instance, in United States v.
Stofsky, 36 the United States Court for the Southern District of New York
held that separate acts of extortion were a pattern.3 7 In Stofsky, the de-
fendants, members of the fur garment union, threatened non-union fur
manufacturers with injury unless they ceased subcontracting with the
union shop manufacturers. The district court held that the separate acts
of extortion were not a series of disconnected acts, but were related to
each other by a common scheme.3 8
Although a pattern usually exists within a common scheme, courts
also have found that a pattern can exist absent a common scheme. In
United States v. Elliott,3 9 the defendants were associated for the purpose of
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985).
In Bascaro the defendant was convicted of a substantive RICO violation as a result of a single attempt
to procure marijuana. Id. at 1360-61. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that possessing and importing marijuana were two separate crimes and consequently two sepa-
rate acts for purposes of RICO. Id. at 1362.
34 Id.
35 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
36 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
37 Id. at 614.
38 Id.
39 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). See also United States v. Weisman,
624 F.2d 1118 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980), where the Second Circuit held that fraud
in the sale of securities and bankruptcy fraud constituted a pattern of racketeering activity even
though a common scheme did not exist. Weisman involved a theater which from its inception to its
collapse was operated through a wide ranging pattern of fraud. The defendant urged the court to
adopt a common scheme requirement to prevent application of RICO to such sporadic activity. Un-
persuaded, the court held that a pattern exists when the acts occur in the conduct of the enterprise's
affairs. Id. at 1122.
In urging the court to adopt a common scheme requirement, the defendant provided support
from Title X, 18 U.S.C. § 3575-78 (1969), a provision of the Organized Crime Control Act dealing
with "Dangerous and Special Offenders." Title X specifies that "a pattern of criminal conduct"
1986]
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profiting from diversified criminal activities.40 The court found a pattern
and held that this type of enterprise was clearly the type of organized
crime RICO was designed to combat.4'
B. The Sedima Case and its Implications
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,42 the Supreme Court noted Civil
RICO's broad scope. Sedima involved a Belgian corporation which en-
tered into a joint venture with the respondent, Imrex Company, to pro-
vide electronic components to a Belgian firm. Believing that the
defendant had presented inflated bills, petitioner Sedima asserted a
RICO claim alleging predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.43 Although
the Court did not reach a pattern issue, Justice White stated that one of
the reasons for the numerous applications of civil RICO has been the
"failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
'pattern.' -44 In a footnote, Justice White stated that "the implication [of
section 1961] is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be suffi-
cient" since "in common parlance two of anything does not generally
form a pattern."'45
After analyzing the language of RICO and its legislative history, Jus-
exists when "criminal acts ... have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). In refusing to apply Title X, the court stated that "the fact
that the two sections [Title IX and Title X] were enacted simultaneously yet embody different defini-
tions of pattern seems to indicate that Congress intentionally chose to use the term differently in
different contexts." 624 F.2d at 1123. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
40 The diversified criminal activities included arson, counterfeit titles, stolen cars, stolen meats,
criminal influence ofjudicial proceedings, murder, extortion and trafficking narcotics.
41 571 F.2d at 904.
42 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). In Sedima, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of prior criminal
conviction and racketeering injury requirements. The Court held that in a civil RICO action there is
no prior conviction requirement nor any requirement that the plaintiff establish a "racketeering in-
jury beyond that resulting from the predicate acts themselves." Id. at 3277. The parties presented
no pattern issue to the Court.
43 Id. at 3279.
44 Id. at 3287.
45 Id. at 3285 n.14. The footnote reads:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a pattern "requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis added), not that it "means" two
such acts. The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.
Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legis-
lative history supports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not consti-
tute a pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic
activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeer-
ing activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity
plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969)
(emphasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting this portion of the
Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[tihe term 'pattern' itself requires the showing
of a relationship .... So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more,
does not establish a pattern .... 116 Cong. Rec. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClel-
lan). See also id. at 35193 (statement of Rep. Poff) (RICO "not aimed at the isolated of-
fender"); House Hearings, at 665. Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision
of the same bill, Congress was more enlightening: "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). This language may be useful in inter-
preting other sections of the Act.
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tice White agreed that it is "the factor of continuity plus relationship
which combines to produce a pattern." 46 Justice Whiteconcluded by not-
ing that Congress was more enlightening in defining "pattern" in Title X
of the same bill, dealing with the sentencing of special offenders, and
"that its language may be useful in interpreting other sections of the
Act." 47 Justice White seemed to suggest that since Congress did not de-
fine "pattern" on the face of Title IX but that it did on the face of Title X
of the same act, courts might find some assistance from Title X's
definition.
Although Sedima did not address a pattern issue, it did recall previ-
ous standards applied by the Court when interpreting RICO.4 8 Courts
should apply the standards which are restated in Sedima when interpret-
ing pattern. First, the courts must look to the language when interpret-
ing a statute because it is the most reliable evidence of congressional
intent.49 Second, courts must read the language of a statute with its plain
meaning, yet view the statute in context.5 0 Third, courts may not read
the language of RICO differently in criminal and civil proceedings. 51
Fourth, courts must read RICO broadly and construe it liberally.52
46 Id.
47 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970)). See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
48 See United States v. Russello, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); and United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981) for the best examples of criminal RICO cases in which the Supreme Court logically analyzed
the statute through clearly stated standards.
49 See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.13 ("Congress['] ... (intent is] best determined by the statu-
tory language it chooses .... [C]ongressional silence... cannot override the words of the stat-
ute."); Russello, 464 U.S. at 20 ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language.")
(citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593 ("The language of the
statute ... [is] the most reliable evidence of... [congressional] intent .... ).
50 See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.13 ("Given the plain words of the statute, we cannot agree
with the court below that Congress could have had no inkling of [§ 1964(c)'s] implications."); Rus-
sello, 464 U.S. at 21 ("[W]e start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the
ordinary meaning of the words used."); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 ("If the statutory language is unam-
biguous, in absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent' to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
Because the statute provides that "pattern" only requires at least two acts within ten years and
one occurring after the effective date of the law, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1984), courts must examine
the plain meaning of the word. "Pattern" is defined as "(1) a design; or, (2) an arrangement or
order of things or activity in abstract senses: order or form discernible in things, actions, ideas,
situations, etc. Frequently with of, as pattern of behavior . . . and as second element with defining
word." VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 315 (1982) (emphasis added). Within the context of
the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court supplemented the plain meaning of "pattern" by
stating that while two acts of racketeering are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Sedima, 105 S.
Ct. at 3285 n.14 . Significantly, the Court used the words "may not be sufficient" rather than "will
not be sufficient." (emphasis added). This implies that under some circumstances, two acts will be
sufficient, and under other circumstances two acts will be insufficient.
51 See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3281 ("Section 1962 renders certain conduct 'unlawful'; § 1963 and
§ 1964 impose consequences, criminal and civil for 'violations' of § 1962. We should not lightly infer
that Congress intended the term to have wholly different meanings in neighboring subsections.").
52 See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3286:
RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self consciously expan-
sive language and overall approach .... but also for its express admonition that "RICO is
to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose." The statute's remedial pur-
poses are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured
by racketeering activity.
See also 105 S. Ct. at 3287 ("[T]he fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly antici-
pated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.") (citing Haroco, Inc.
v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct.
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Sedima also directed courts to the text of RICO and its legislative history
when interpreting the statute.53
Finally, it is essential in any statutory analysis to heed the Supreme
Court's words that when Congress includes or omits limiting language in
a bill it is presumed that it did so intentionally.5 4 Thus, although Title
X's definition of pattern may prove helpful, courts must remember to use
it within the proper context and read it in light of RICO's stated purpose.
In Title X, a pattern of criminal conduct accords special offender status
for purposes of sentencing.55 Title X states that "conduct forms a pat-
tern if it embraces acts that have similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated... and
not isolated events." 56 Significantly, Title X uses the word "if," implying
that if the subsequent conditions are met, a pattern exists. It does not
use the word must, however, and thereby limits a pattern to the subse-
quent definition. Furthermore, the fact that Title IX and X were enacted
simultaneously, yet embody different definitions of pattern, indicates that
Congress intentionally chose to use the term differently in the two
contexts. 57
C. "Single Episode" versus "Common Scheme" Analysis Since Sedima
In pre-Sedima cases the courts did not follow the "single episode"
argument made by defendants for purposes of defeating a RICO claim
because it lacked support from the statute, its purpose and legislative
history.58 Now, however, courts ruling under this theory for the defend-
ants are claiming support from Sedima.5 9 Furthermore, courts have
blurred the distinction between the single episode and the common
scheme analysis. 60 The following cases are good examples of this propo-
sition and also illustrate the tension developing between some of the dis-
trict and circuit courts in finding a pattern.
In Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips,6 1 the United States Court of
at 3291 (1985)); Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3283 n.10 ("[I]f Congress' liberal construction mandate is to be
applied anywhere it is in § 1964, where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident."). Accord-
ingly, it would be impermissible to use the concept of "pattern" to artificially narrow RICO's scope.
53 See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3280 ("[lIt is worth briefly reviewing the legislative history .. "). See
also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586 ("[T]he language of the statute and its legislative history indicate that
Congress was well aware that it was entering into a new domain ...."); id. at 590 ("In view of the
purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are unpersuaded that Con-
gress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of organized crime ....").
The legislative history of RICO specifically states that the target is not sporadic activity. S. REP. No.
617, supra note 14 at 158. See also supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. In addition, the term
"pattern" indicates that multiple and unrelated acts (not schemes, transactions or episodes) and the
threat of continuing criminal activity are required; it "is this factor of continuity plus relationship which
combines to produce a pattern." S. REP. No. 617, supra note 14, at 158 (emphasis added).
54 See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section ...
but omits it in another . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acted intentionally and
purposely.").
55 See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1970).
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 See United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
58 See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 64-68 & 78 and accompanying text.
60 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
61 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a retailer's mailing of fraudu-
lent tax returns constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. 62 In Phil-
lips, defendant mailed nine fraudulent tax returns to the state of Illinois
over a nine month period. The court noted that since RICO defines
"racketeering activity" to include mail fraud, defendant's mailings consti-
tuted a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in the statute itself.63
The Phillips case, however, stands in sharp contrast with Northern
Trust Bank O'Hare v. Inryco.64 In Inryco, the trustee filed suit alleging that
a contractor and employee violated RICO when they participated in a
construction kickback scheme conducted through the mail with the sub-
contractor. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held, however, that the mailing of more than one letter was
merely implementing the same or common kickback scheme and, there-
fore, could not constitute a pattern.65 The court stated that while "pat-
tern" connotes relatedness, it similarly connotes a multiplicity of
events. 66 In light of the legislative history, the court found it difficult to
see how a threat of continuity could be established in a single criminal
episode.67 Relying on Sedima, the court found that the "single criminal
episode" did not satisfy the requirement of relationship plus a threat of
continuing criminal activity. 68
While these two cases were analyzed under different theories, Phillips
under the common scheme theory and Inryco under the single episode
theory, the cases are factually similar; each case involved a common
scheme of sorts, the same parties,69 and the use of the mail to further a
criminal scheme. Moreover, the schemes were carried out over similar
periods of time. The cases differ analytically, however, because the Phil-
lips court correctly refused to read Sedima as a rejection of the type of
pattern of criminal activity which involves the same parties and the carry-
ing out of a single criminal scheme,70 whereas the Inryco court had incor-
rectly interpreted Sedima as such a rejection. 7' In Intyco, the court used
the single episode theory as an illusory argument to defeat the RICO
claim.72
In ruling for the defendant, a court will usually distinguish a "com-
mon scheme" case from a "single episode" case. 73 The two situations,
however, are often identical. In fact, the terms "single episode" and
62 Id. at 313.
63 Id.
64 615 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
65 Id. at 833.
66 Id. at 831.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 But see, S.J. Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp. v. Jankung, 627 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Injankung, the defendant corporation misrepresented through mail and telephone communications
its competitor's solvency and ability to supply material to potential customers. The court distin-
guished these facts from Inryco by stating that this case involved separate acts of fraud over various
and separate parties. Id. at 577.
70 771 F.2d at 313.
71 615 F. Supp. at 833.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text; and Inyco, 615 F.
Supp. 830, supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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"common scheme" have been used interchangeably by courts, often be-
cause of the lack of distinction. 74 In one case, a court even used the hy-
brid term "single scheme" to describe such a situation.75
Similar tensions exist between other district and circuit courts. For
instance, prior to Sedima, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit sustained a RICO conviction in United States v. Calabrese76
for a "single scheme" whereby the defendants defrauded the same par-
ties by using a Utah building supply company as a front for a fraudulent
scheme to obtain building materials on credit with no intention of paying
for them.77 While the case involved the same fraudulent acts on the
same parties, federal district courts within the Tenth Circuit have pre-
cluded conviction under RICO for similar transactions since Sedima.78
Such an argument which cites Sedima as support, however, is illusory and
courts outside the Tenth Circuit have recognized this. 79
Courts have held inconsistently when looking to Sedima for an inter-
pretation of "pattern." Because the Supreme Court did not define "pat-
tern" in Sedima, it should not represent direct support for a lower court's
interpretation that "pattern" requires more than one criminal episode.
For instance, courts claiming support from Sedima when following the
"single episode" theory for the purpose of defeating RICO ignore the
Court's use of Title X's language which encourages the finding of a com-
mon scheme.80 At the same time, courts requiring a common scheme
should not claim support from Sedima because the Court also suggested
that courts look to the legislative history as a reference when interpreting
pattern. Because the legislative history states that one of RICO's pur-
poses is to eradicate diversified criminal activity, 81 a common scheme re-
quirement would preclude conviction of enterprises involved in some
types of a criminal activity. Yet RICO clearly was designed to combat
74 See, e.g., Inryco, supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text; andJankung, supra note 69.
75 SeeJankung, supra note 69.
76 645 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981).
77 Id. at 1385.
78 See, e.g., Miller v. Calvin, No. 82-F-2253 (D. Colo. October 21, 1985) (defendants made mis-
representations in a preliminary prospectus and registration statement distributed in connection
with a public offering); Professional Assets Management v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F. Supp. 1418 (D.
Okla. 1985) (there was an insufficient showing of pattern when Professional Assets brought action
against defendant accounting firm for the preparation and issuance of one fraudulent audit report
on a bank).
79 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986) (accounting firm
found guilty of fraudulently inducing banks to extend credit to a failing corporation through a pat-
tern of fraud consisting of nine separate acts of mail fraud). See also R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt,
774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985) wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that two acts of mail fraud were sufficient to constitute a pattern in a scheme to defraud a company.
Id. at 1352. In Hyatt, the first mailing involved allegedly false invoices and rental fees for services
performed by the defendant for the plaintiff. The second alleged act of mail fraud occurred when
defendant's counsel mailed copies of the invoices to the plaintiffs. The court was not persuaded by
Sedima's language that "while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient." Id. at 1355 (quot-
ing Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n. 14). The court stated that Sedima only implied that two isolated acts
could not constitute a pattern. 774 F.2d at 1355. The court reasoned that Sedima was looking for the
element of "relatedness" to be present in a pattern, and held that the alleged acts of mail fraud were
sufficiently related. Id.
80 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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this type of organized activity. 82 Some courts, however, have properly
read Sedima's dicta on pattern and analyzed the concept in the proper
light.8 3 In finding a pattern, one court rejected the defendants' reliance
on Sedima, pointing out that Sedima's footnote merely suggested refer-
ences to use when interpreting pattern and that the Supreme Court
never actually reached a pattern issue.84
III. Defining Pattern Within RICO's Substantive Violations
Section 1962(a)-(d) provides the various ways to violate RICO.85
RICO makes it unlawful for a person to: (a) use income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise;86
(b) acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity; 87 (c) conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity;8 8 or (d) conspire to commit any of these
offenses.89
Since the different kinds of RICO violations contained in subsec-
tions (a) through (d) contemplate different criminal circumstances, differ-
ent kinds of relationships and threats of continuity should establish the
pattern of racketeering activity. 90 For example, in United States v. Mc-
Nary,9 1 the court found that the defendant violated section 1962(a) by
investing income derived from a pattern of bribery and extortion into a
travel agency. 92 The court found that the pattern of racketeering activity
82 See, e.g., United States v. Qauod, 777 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1499
(1986). In Qauod, the enterprise was a group of individuals who were involved in kickback schemes
in order to influence judicial proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the affairs of the enterprise which included bribery, mail fraud, and obstruction of criminal
investigation, supplied the necessary nexus between the enterprise and the racketeering activity. Id.
at 1116. Qauod illustrates that, consistent with earlier case law, courts since Sedima have continued to
recognize that while a pattern of racketeering held together by a common scheme is a pattern, a
common scheme is not always necessary. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text; United
States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983) ("It is unnecessary that the underlying predi-
cate acts be interrelated as long as the acts are connected to the affairs of the enterprise.") (citing
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982)), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 86 (1984); United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1101, 1017 (6th Cir. 1980) ("The
Supreme Court has never held it is a requirement of a valid conviction for conspiracy, that every
conspirator must have agreed, or intended to conduct or participate in every [predicate act] commit-
ted by [the others].").
83 See, e.g., United Fish Co. v. Barnes, 627 F. Supp. 732 (D. Maine 1986) wherein the court held
that the defendants conducted fraudulent transactions on behalf of the fish company through a pat-
tern of mail and wire fraud. See also Hyatt, supra note 79, at 1355.
For RICO securities cases in which the courts have found patterns in light of Sedima, see Acker-
man v. Schadeff, No. 82-2253 (W.D. Wa. 1986), cited in RICO Bus. DisptrrEs GUIDE (CCH) 6278
(July 8, 1986) (involving a limited partnership offering wherein the court found a pattern consisting
of 50 separate fraudulent offerings made to investors); First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Oppenheim, Appel,
Dixon, 629 F. Supp. 427, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (the court upheld plaintiffs RICO claim and securities
fraud action by investors against dealer's accounting firm based on the mailing of audit confirmation
letters containing false statements).
84 See Barnes, supra note 83.
85 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
87 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
88 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
89 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).
90 See supra note 13.
91 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
92 Id. at 623.
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consisted of five separate real estate transactions. 93 The Court held that
the investment or use of the proceeds of such income was the exact activ-
ity proscribed by subsection (a)'s language 94 of "using income derived
from a pattern ... to acquire an interest in an enterprise." 95 Thus, in
determining whether a pattern exists within a subsection (a) violation,
courts must analyze the situation by: (1) looking to the activity pro-
scribed by subsection (a); and then (2) defining the "relationship plus
continuity" formulation in light of the crime Congress intended to
eradicate.
A different situation, however, arises in the context of a subsection
(b) violation. For example, in United States v. Parness,96 the court found
the defendant guilty of a section 1962(b) violation by acquiring an enter-
prise (a casino hotel) through a "pattern" consisting of two acts of trans-
porting stolen cashier checks. 97 In Parness, the defendant owned a
corporation through which he ran "junkets" and collected markers from
gamblers for the hotel-casino. Parness, however, withheld $400,000 in
overdue "markers," forcing the hotel-casino inolved into borrowing
enormous sums of money from Parness until he eventually foreclosed it.
The court convicted Parness of acquiring the hotel-casino through a pat-
tern of racketeering which consisted of the interstate transportation of
two cashier checks. 98
Because subsection (b) prohibits maintaining or acquiring an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity, a common scheme is re-
quired for a subsection (b) violation since the aquisition or the
maintenance is the scheme or plan. Thus, subsection (b) implicitly re-
quires that the criminal acts be related to one another. Furthermore, the
nature of the transaction involved, i.e., the takeover of the running of the
enterprise, establishes the threat of continuing criminal activity until the
scheme (the takeover) is accomplished. In determining whether a pat-
tern exists within a subsection (b) violation the courts should analyze the
situation by (1) looking to the activity proscribed within subsection (b);
and (2) looking for the proper relationship between the acts themselves
and how they work to accomplish the criminal scheme. In such a case the
acts should not appear to be unrelated in time and manner as they might
within a subsection (a) violation. 99
Subsection (c) violations arise under contexts different from those
involved in either subsection (a) or (b) violations. For instance, in United
States v. Elliott, i ° the enterprise involved was an illegitimate organiza-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 629.
95 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
96 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
97 Id. at 439.
98 Id. at 441-42.
99 The statute, however, has no requirements of how close in time the criminal acts must occur.
Nor does it make sense to require such a standard. Whether the acts occur over days, months or
years, all the statute and its purpose implies is that they be sufficiently related to each other so as to
appear obvious parts of the takeover. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
100 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). See supra notes 39-41 and accompa-
nying text.
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tion-a group associated in fact with no other purpose but to engage in
diversified criminal activity. The enterprise did nothing but "conduct its
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 10' Although Congress
did not intend to exclude this type of group from the reach of the statute,
this would occur if the legislative history were read to require the same
standard of "relationship" and "continuity" for a subsection (c) violation
as it does for a subsection (b) violation.
Courts would in some cases subvert RICO's purpose by requiring a
relationship between the acts in subsection (c) (or subsection (d) conspir-
acy violations) since little or no relationship exists between the acts of an
illicit organization whose sole purpose is to engage in criminal activities.
On the other hand, courts would not subvert RICO's purpose in such a
case by requiring a relationship between the illicit enterprise and the
acts. Moreover, the nature of the enterprise which exists only to carry
out criminal activities would serve as the threat of continuing criminal
activity.
The "relationship plus continuity" formulation must vary slightly
within the various contexts under which a RICO violation may arise. In
other words, in order for courts to reach the different kinds of activity
that RICO was intended to reach, different standards for "relationship"
and for "threat of continuity" are necessary in determining whether or
not a pattern exists. Also, the single episode and the common scheme
modes of analysis must be tailored to fit within the purpose of RICO and
its proscribed activities.
For example, recall the earlier discussed Watchmaker case' 0 2 which
involved the Outlaw Motorcycle Club, a group associated in fact for the
purpose of engaging in illicit activities.' 0 3 Although the acts occurred in
the course of a single criminal episode, the court found that the "rela-
tionship" requirement was satisfied by the fact that the three shootings
were related to the enterprise. 10 4 The court also found that the purpose
and nature of the enterprise satisfied the requirement of a threat of con-
tinuity because the motorcycle gang would continue carrying out illicit
activities. 10 5 Thus, if the Watchmaker court had required a common
scheme, the court would not have found a pattern. Yet the activity was
clearly the type of activity Congress intended to reach through RICO.
Taking the analysis one step further, a "single criminal episode"
case like Watchmaker cannot be distinguished easily from a "common
scheme" case such as United States v. Weatherspoon. 106 In Weatherspoon, the
defendant violated RICO through a scheme to defraud the government
by a "pattern" consisting of five mailings of false statements to the Vet-
eran's Administration. 0 7 Both Watchmaker and Weatherspoon involved
101 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).





106 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
107 Id. at 602. The court rejected the contention that constituent acts do not form a pattern
unless they are performed in the course of separate criminal episodes. The court stated:
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only one type of racketeering activity defined in the activities which Con-
gress clearly intended to eradicate.108
The terms used in these cases ("single episode" and "common
scheme") merely described the unlawful activities involved. They were
not invoked as standards or rigid requirements for determining a pattern
issue. Yet courts continue to use the single episode argument to disallow
a RICO claim.' 0 9 Watchmaker illustrates a single criminal episode case
which clearly falls within RICO's purpose. One cannot argue that no pat-
tern exists because the acts occurred within the course of a single crimi-
nal episode. Neither the statute nor legislative history contain such a
standard or requirement. The single episode argument represents an ar-
tificial judge-made distinction, which courts have created solely for the
purpose of defeating a RICO violation. Moreover, unless the term "sin-
gle episode" is defined appropriately within the purpose of RICO it can-
not be viewed as a product of logical analysis. The definition of pattern
should vary according to the alleged violation.
IV. Conclusion
Courts must decide how to define "pattern," remaining consistent
with RICO's text, legislative history and purpose to provide enhanced
sanctions against organized crime. Reading too much into Sedima aggra-
vates an already existing tension among the courts. Although the
Supreme Court recognized in Sedima that a meaningful interpretation of
pattern was necessary, 110 it did not supply any interpretation. Nowhere
did the Supreme Court contend that one comprehensive scheme involv-
ing several related unlawful actions would not constitute a pattern. No-
where did the Court establish rigid standards for satisfying the
"relationship plus continuity" formulation. And nowhere did the Court
even imply that only one definition would suffice. One definition will not
do; the definition of pattern must vary according to the violation alleged.
The Supreme Court in Sedima did state, however, that two acts are
necessary but may not be sufficient,"' and that isolated acts are not a
pattern.11 2 Beyond this, courts should only interpret pattern in light of
the following references suggested in a footnote by the Court: The stat-
ute, its plain language, purpose, legislative history, and other pertinent
A "scheme to defraud" is not an "act" indictable under the mail fraud statute, for though
the offense of mail fraud "has as its genesis in the scheme of defraud, the very gist of [the
crime] is the use of mails in executing the scheme." U.S. v. Crummer, 151 F.2d 958, 962
(10th Cir. 1946). It is for this reason that each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to de-
fraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 even though there is but one scheme
involved.
Id. at 602.
108 In Watchmaker the pattern consisted of three acts of attempted murder. 761 F.2d at 1476. In
Weatherspoon the pattern consisted of five acts of mailing in a scheme to defraud the Veteran's Admin-
istration. 581 F.2d at 602. Furthermore, both crimes, the attempted murder in Watchmaker and the
mail fraud in Weatherspoon, are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) as "racketeering activities."
109 See supra note 78.




provisions of the Act.' 13 Courts must apply the facts of the case to the
violations alleged, look to the purpose of the Act, and then apply the
appropriate interpretation. If courts ignore this line of analysis in light
of the explicit title of the Act, as well as the statement of purpose and the
plain language of Title IX, it will not be Congress that will have failed to




114 Congress has considered reforming RICO. Hearings have been held in the House and Senate
on RICO reform legislation. See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). On October 7, 1986 the House passed H.R. 5445 which
would have imposed express statutory limitations on "pattern" for private civil litigation. 132 CONG.
REC. H9377 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986). Under the new language, "pattern" would require at least two
acts of illicit activity, one of which occurred not more than five years after the prior act of illicit
activity; the acts must not have been so closely related in time and place that together they consti-
tuted a single episode; and each act, for actions brought under § 1962 (c), must be related to the
affairs of the enterprise.
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